The Analytic Narrative Project by Bates, Robert H. et al.
 American Political Science Association and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve 
 and extend access to The American Political Science Review.
http://www.jstor.org
Review: The Analytical Narrative Project 
Author(s): Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Barry 
Weingast, Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry 
Weingast 
Source:   The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 696-702
Published by:  American Political Science Association
Stable URL:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585843
Accessed: 08-03-2016 21:44 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
 info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content 
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. 
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 21:44:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Analytic Narratives September 2000
 The Analytic Narrative Project
 ROBERT H. BATES Harvard University
 AVNER GREIF Stanford University
 MARGARET LEVI University of Washington
 JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL University of California, Los Angeles
 BARRY R. WEINGAST Stanford University
 In Analytic Narratives, we attempt to address several
 issues. First, many of us are engaged in in-depth
 case studies, but we also seek to contribute to, and
 to make use of, theory. How might we best proceed?
 Second, the historian, the anthropologist, and the area
 specialist possess knowledge of a place and time. They
 have an understanding of the particular. How might
 they best employ such data to create and test theories
 that may apply more generally? Third, what is the
 contribution of formal theory? What benefits are, or
 can be, secured by formalizing verbal accounts? In
 recent years, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) and
 Green and Shapiro (1994) have provoked debate over
 these and related issues. In Analytic Narratives, we join
 in the methodological discussions spawned by their
 contributions.
 In one sense, the aim of our book is quite modest:
 We hope to clarify the commonalities in approach used
 by a number of scholars, including us. We do not claim
 to be developing a brand new method. Rather, we are
 systematizing and making explicit-and labeling-what
 others also attempt.1 In another sense, the aim of the
 book is ambitious; by trying to systematize we begin to
 force ourselves and others to lay out the rules for doing
 analytic narratives and to clarify how such an approach
 advances knowledge. We realize that our book is only
 a first step and concur with another of our reviewers:
 "As a method, analytic narrative is clearly still in its
 infancy, but it has promise" (Goldstone 1999, 533).
 We have an additional aim: to transcend some of the
 current and unproductive "tribal warfare," especially
 between the new economic versus historical institution-
 alists and between advocates of unbounded and
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 We wish to thank a number of people who gave us very helpful
 comments as we thought about how best to respond: Yoram Barzel,
 David Epstein, Michael Hechter, John Ferejohn, Bryan Jones, Jim
 Johnson, Edgar Kiser, Jack Knight, David Laitin, Mark Lichbach,
 Douglass North, Sunita Parikh, and several anonymous reviewers.
 I Many others write analytic narratives that combine detailed data
 collection with rational choice or game theory analyses. Among them
 are Gary Cox, Jean Ensminger, Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, Barbara
 Geddes, Anthony Gill, Miriam Golden, Stathis Kalyvas, Edgar Kiser,
 David Laitin, John Nye, Sunita Parikh, Roger Petersen, and Susan
 Whiting.
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 bounded rationality. We believe that each of these
 perspectives brings something of value, and to different
 degrees the essays in our book represent an integration
 of perspectives. By explicitly outlining an approach that
 relies on rational choice and mathematical models, we
 do not mean to imply that other approaches lack rigor
 but, rather, to reveal how to apply our tools in a useful
 and explanatory way. We wish to join the debate, not
 claim an end to it.
 Part of that debate is among the five of us. Achieving
 a minimal degree of consensus was no easy task. By
 including a set of individually authored essays that
 reveal both our commonalities and differences, we
 indicate the range of possible approaches while also
 attempting to create boundaries. The five studies all
 draw from the same general rational choice approach.
 Even Levi's norms of fairness are modeled in terms of
 rational choice (in fact, this is part of Elster's objec-
 tion). We have accepted rational choice theory and are
 among those attempting to extend it in historical and
 comparative research. We are imperialists if that
 means believing, as Gary Becker did when he applied
 neoclassical economics to the family and to discrimi-
 nation, that the domain of rational choice can be
 usefully enlarged. We are not imperialists if that means
 believing that rational choice theory is the only possible
 approach to historical and comparative research.
 The central problem we tackle in Analytic Narratives
 is how to develop systematic explanations based on
 case studies.2 King, Keohane, and Verba correctly urge
 us to move toward generalizing. They recommend that
 scholars first consider how to define the universe of
 cases of which their case is an element and then
 attempt to devise a way of drawing a sample from that
 universe. This is excellent advice. The problem is that,
 for many studies, their approach is not so easy to apply,
 at least in the initial stages of research. Many political
 scientists begin with an interest in a particular phenom-
 enon, such as the American Civil War, the French
 Revolution, the cause of World War I, the fall of
 socialism, or the rise of the New Deal. At the beginning
 of research, before formulation of an account of the
 phenomenon, the universe of cases containing a case of
 this sort is not obvious. Indeed, only after acquiring a
 significant understanding of the phenomenon-that is,
 only after much if not all the research has been
 concluded- can a scholar have any prospect for defin-
 ing the larger universe of events.
 2 We are hardly the first to attempt this. See, for example, Eckstein
 1975, George and McKeown 1985, Lijphart 1971, and Przeworski
 and Teune 1970.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Tue, 08 Mar 2016 21:44:55 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3
 The five of us, representing two different disciplines,
 all use the analytic narrative approach to achieve
 insights into different puzzles in very different historical
 periods. A major problem we address is how to develop
 systematic explanations for, and extract valid infer-
 ences from, such cases. Each chapter identifies a puzzle
 unique to the place and period under study, offers an
 explanation by using the tools of analytic narrative, and
 lays out the more general questions raised by the
 specific study. Moreover, in each chapter, the author
 derives a model and confirms its implications with data.
 Greif investigates the growth of Genoa in the twelfth
 century and accounts for the puzzle of how the pod-
 esta, a ruler with no military power, resolved harmful
 clan conflict and promoted economic prosperity. His
 case has implications generally for issues of factional
 conflict and political order. Rosenthal models both
 long-term and divergent institutional change among
 countries and offers new insights into the relationship
 between war and governmental regimes by investigat-
 ing the differences in taxation in France and England in
 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Levi ac-
 counts for the variation in nineteenth-century conscrip-
 tion laws in France, the United States, and Prussia and
 finds that changing norms of fairness, resulting from
 democratization, influence the timing and content of
 institutional change. By focusing on the balance rule
 and how it deflected civil war in the United States,
 Weingast advances the program of understanding the
 institutional foundations and effects of federalism.
 Bates analyzes the rise and fall of the International
 Coffee Agreement; he discovers and explains why
 during World War II and the Cold War the United
 States, a principal coffee consumer, cooperated with
 the cartel to stabilize prices. His major finding concerns
 the circumstances under which a political basis for
 organization will trump economic competition in an
 international market.
 Our project represents a means of connecting the
 seemingly unique event with standard social science
 methods. First, we model a portion of the critical
 dynamics in a way that affords tests of parts of the idea.
 This in itself is worthwhile. Second, we go farther and
 attempt to use the single case to generate hypotheses
 applicable to a larger set of cases. It is only in devel-
 oping the account or model that we are pushed toward
 seeing what components of the account are testable
 and generalizable.
 Before turning to our response to Jon Elster, it is
 worth considering his approach to social science. El-
 ster's review attacks all forms of social science expla-
 nation that attempt to provide systematic answers to
 political, economic, and historic questions. Analytic
 Narratives is simply his current foil. Elster has a very
 circumscribed conception of what constitutes useful
 theory. He claims (1999a) that social scientists can do
 little more than develop a repertoire of mechanisms.
 His observation of "both the failures to predict and the
 predictions that failed" has entrenched his skepticism
 about the possibility of law-like explanations, a skepti-
 cism "bordering on explanatory nihilism," redeemed
 only by "the recognition of the idea of a mechanism
 that could provide a measure of explanatory power"
 (1999a, 2). We, in contrast, believe that although we
 may not be able to derive general laws, we nonetheless
 can develop, refine, and test theory-driven models and
 thus employ theory to gain deeper insights into the
 complex workings of the real world. Our book features
 both efforts to employ such models and discussions of
 the difficulties encountered when doing so.3
 ELSTER'S QUESTIONS
 Elster poses six questions and an additional set of
 concerns. The first is: "Do they agree with my charac-
 terization of analytic narrative as deductive history and
 with my statement that in practice this tends to mean
 rational choice history?" This raises two questions, one
 about the role of rational choice theory and one about
 deductive history. Yes, we use and have a preference
 for rational choice theory, but it is not a necessary
 condition for an analytic narrative. For example, one
 could use instead prospect theory or any systematic
 theory of individual choice, including nonrational the-
 ories of choice, to generate the predictions of individ-
 ual behavior. Aside from prospect theory, however, the
 alternatives are not sufficiently developed to provide a
 consistent technique for generating behavior in games.
 Turning to the issue of deductive history, we observe
 that analytic narratives are not deductive histories. In
 particular, we do not deduce the structure of the game
 from first principles. Of course, all rational choice
 models are deductive, but the deductive component,
 especially when applying game theory, assumes the
 existence of an appropriate game to analyze. Yet, there
 exists no finite list of games or any reason to believe
 that there is one. By the same reasoning, we should not
 expect to find a French Revolution game, the Ameri-
 can Civil War game, or the Genoese game. It is at
 precisely this point that an analytic narrative relies on
 inductive methods. We take pains to explain that the
 process of deciding the appropriate individuals, their
 preferences, and the structure of the environment-
 that is, the right game to use-is an inductive process
 much like that used in modern comparative politics, by
 historical institutionalists, and by historians. Once that
 induction is complete, we can use the deductive meth-
 ods to study behavior within the context of the game.
 Elster's second question is: "Do they agree that a
 plausible analytic narrative requires independent evi-
 dence for intentions and beliefs?" This can be read as
 concerning the relationship between rational choice
 methods and interpretive methods that tell us how
 individuals construct understandings of their world and
 give meaning to their life. Much of everyday life and of
 politics is about this, and rational choice theorists have
 for too long ignored these concerns. Luckily, there is a
 critical trend among a subset of rational choice theo-
 rists who have been trying to integrate interpretive and
 3A related discussion in sociology was begun by Stinchcombe (1968,
 1978) and takes its current form in a debate sparked by Kiser and
 Hechter (1991, 1998; also see the responses by Quadagno and Knapp
 1992; Skocpol 1994; and Somers 1998).
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 rationalist accounts. An article by John Ferejohn
 (1991) exemplifies the effort, as does a recent book by
 David Laitin (1998). Some of our own work (Bates, de
 Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998; Levi 1997; Rakove,
 Rutten, and Weingast 1999) is self-consciously part of
 this enterprise.
 To varying degrees the chapters in Analytic Narra-
 tives contribute to this program. Each of us has labored
 for years on the subject on which we write. Where
 necessary, we learned new languages; where feasible,
 we worked in the field. Each of us spent long periods in
 the archives, both public and private, and immersed
 ourselves in the secondary literature on our subject.
 Indeed, immersion of this sort constitutes a core part of
 the method we advocate. We seek not only to bring
 theory to bear upon data but also to bring data to bear
 upon theory. We strongly endorse the use of qualitative
 materials, fieldwork, and the painstaking reconstruc-
 tion of events as anticipated, observed, and interpreted
 by political actors. Such intimacy with detail, we argue,
 must inform the selection and specification of the
 model to be tested and should give us a grasp of the
 intentions and beliefs of the actors.
 There is also a narrower issue that Elster raises. He
 argues that without independent knowledge of the
 intentions and beliefs of the actors, the assumption of
 rationality adds little, resulting in explanations that are
 tautological. We disagree with Elster's equation of the
 words of actors with their intentions.4 For example,
 there are two ways to read James Madison. The typical
 modern political theory approach takes the text and
 studies its ideas apart from the historical context,
 assessing Madison's discussion of an ideal world. In
 contrast, a historical approach embeds Madison in his
 context and suggests that he was constructing a politi-
 cal document designed to persuade a certain group of
 citizens to support the proposed revisions to the U.S.
 Constitution. It is clear from Madison's own writing
 that he did not believe in this as the ideal.
 The point is that an assessment of Madison's inten-
 tions is an enormously difficult and necessarily specu-
 lative task. Because it is so difficult to judge intentions,
 rational choice theorists tend to rely instead on re-
 vealed preferences and behavior. Indeed, even in in-
 stances in which Elster claims we considered intentions
 directly, we did not do so. When Levi discusses legis-
 lative debates, she understands the legislators' public
 arguments as behavior; their rhetoric is often calcu-
 lated and strategic, meant to attract certain constitu-
 ents or change the votes of other legislators.
 Thus, to the specific question of the requirement of
 independent evidence for intentions and belief, we give
 a negative answer.
 Elster's third question is: "Do they agree that a
 plausible analytic narrative must be at the level of
 individual actors or, failing that, that specific reasons
 must be provided in a given case to explain why
 4 Despite Elster's attempt to say otherwise, how else can one read his
 statement that Bates through interviews and Levi through interpre-
 tation of parliamentary debates "provide direct evidence about
 mental states" (Elster 2000, 693)?
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 aggregates can be treated as if they were individuals?"
 Highlighting the disjuncture between individual and
 collective rationality, Elster takes us to task for relying
 on the use of aggregates: "the elite," "the North," and
 so forth. "Rational choice explanations divorced from
 methodological individualism," he maintains, "have
 dubious value" (Elster 2000, 693).
 Whether aggregation is justified depends on the
 extent to which the problem of decision making within
 the aggregated unit can be examined separately from
 the interactions among such units. The question is
 empirical, not theoretical. Aggregation is widely used
 in economics and political science because it is often an
 appropriate assumption that leads to tractable analysis
 highlighting processes at the aggregate level. Firms and
 families, rather than rational individuals, long stood on
 the supply and demand side of the economist's market,
 and political parties-along with rational candidates-
 contest Downsian elections. In each case, the aggrega-
 tion assumption makes the analysis tractable.
 In the case of the Genoese clans, for example, there
 is evidence (apart from the implications of the assump-
 tion that such separation is appropriate) that directly
 supports decision making by the clan. The constraint of
 "one person, one vote" will lead us away from under-
 standing the politics of Genoa as a republic. The same
 holds true with respect to other chapters. Should Bates
 go to the level of the individual American and his/her
 interest in the Cold War?
 At least two of us went farther to explore the
 institutional mechanisms that produce (in the case of
 Bates) or that fail to produce (in the case of Weingast)
 a well-defined preference ordering. Contrary to El-
 ster's claim, then, we do not ignore the paradox of
 collective irrationality but, rather, employ it as a wedge
 with which to open the analysis of the influence of
 institutions.
 Collectively, however, we urge caution about taking
 collectivities as actors, capable of formulating and
 pursuing coherent and sophisticated strategies. Each of
 us attempted to move to the highest level of disaggre-
 gation that was appropriate; thus, Weingast's unpack-
 ing of the Senate and Greif's treatment of free riding in
 the politics of Genoa.
 Elster's last three questions are: "Do they agree that
 standard rational choice theory needs to be modified to
 take account of the findings of bounded rationality
 theory and of behavioral economics? Do they agree
 that it also needs to be modified to take into account
 nonrational motivations? Do they agree that at present
 there is no way to model nonrational motivations and
 how they interact with rational motivations, at least not
 in a way that yields determinate deductions?
 Long a student of rationality, Elster advances impor-
 tant arguments regarding our use of rational choice
 theory. As do others, Elster recognizes that people
 cannot possibly perform the calculations necessary for
 backward induction. Instead, he urges us to assume
 bounded rather than full rationality. He also criticizes
 the assumption that actors can pursue objectives in an
 instrumentally rational manner, arguing that emotions
 and other nonrational motivations play a stronger role
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 than we accord them. Finally, he suggests that recog-
 nizing the role of nonrational motivations questions
 the very possibility of modeling in the way we do.
 As a team, we are divided over the first of Elster's
 arguments; some of us agree and find it increasingly
 difficult to defend the assumption of full rationality as
 a "necessary convenience." But even those of us dis-
 comfited by this assumption reject Elster's implication.
 Elster implies that inferences drawn from the use of
 models that incorporate such assumptions must be
 flawed, whereas we find some of these models highly
 insightful. They help us understand just how and why
 the balance rule worked to preserve political order in
 the United States before the Civil War; just how and
 why the rules of the International Coffee Organization
 influenced the allocation of the "coffee dollar" in
 international markets; and just how and why an official
 (the podesta') with just twenty soldiers brought peace
 and prosperity to the most powerful city-state in the
 twelfth century Mediterranean world. The burden falls
 on Elster, then, to show how the assumptions we made
 led us to err. Just how were we misled by them? How
 would the outcomes have differed had we assumed
 boundedly rational actors?
 We have no difficultly conceding that emotional life
 is powerful and affects behavior. We also have no
 difficulty conceding that a rational choice account
 grounded only in material interests may be both unre-
 alistic and analytically limited. For Elster's critique to
 carry more force, however, it is necessary that he show
 how the inclusion of nonrational motivations would
 improve the power of our particular analyses. We
 employed models to explain, not to describe; our
 models therefore need not capture every feature of
 human life. The ratio between the variance they con-
 front and the variance they explain provides a measure
 of their success. Until Elster shows how explicit refer-
 ence to emotional life and other nonrational motiva-
 tions would enhance that ratio in the accounts we
 offer,5 his criticism points to an omission but not to an
 error arising from that omission. He runs the risk of
 weakening the power of his explanation. At the least,
 his argument fails to point out errors of commission, as
 he suggests.
 Elster has been a preeminent advocate of rational
 choice theory and then of considering nonrational
 motivations. In social science today, the attempt to
 develop better models of choice and action represents
 an extraordinarily important and exciting program, one
 to which we all subscribe to varying degrees. Analytic
 Narratives is, after all, dedicated to Douglass North,
 whose recent work focuses on developing better cog-
 nitive models (1991; also see Denzau and North 1994),
 and, among us, Levi in particular is identified with the
 project of understanding the limits of rationality and
 rational choice (Alt, Levi, and Ostrom 1999; Cook and
 Levi 1990; Braithwaite and Levi 1998).
 Yet, Elster's program fails what Kenneth Shepsle
 Bilster attempts to do this in his 1999 books, but he does not
 demonstrate there or in his review how his claims produce different
 analyses than the ones we offer.
 once called "the first law of wing-walking," which holds
 that you do not let go of something until you have a
 grip on something else. We do not throw out models
 based on rationality just because we agree that there
 are nonrational aspects of choice. We are likely to
 learn quite a bit in the next ten years about how to
 extend choice-theoretic methods to include emotional
 and nonrational elements. The approach will be much
 stronger for this. But we do not believe that this now
 requires abandoning our current tools. Nonrational
 approaches to choice are not yet far enough along to
 provide an analytic approach that challenges or extends
 the traditional choice framework, at least as applied to
 empirical research outside the laboratory (see, how-
 ever, Jones 1999). There are, nonetheless, scholars who
 are beginning to integrate expressive and rational bases
 of action. For example, Elster's own work on emotions
 and social norms (1991a, 1999a, 1999b) explores a
 range of useful phenomena and mechanisms that will
 prove useful. Sunita Parikh (in process) explores riots
 as events whose explanation requires understanding a
 mix of motivations and behavior. Thus, in contrast to
 Elster's implied thesis (in question six) that "there is no
 way of modeling nonrational motivations and how they
 interact with rational motivations, at least not in a way
 that yields determinate deductions," we believe that
 there are good first models of how noninterest-based
 and even nonrational motivations might interact with
 rational motivations (e.g., Bates, de Figueiredo, and
 Weingast 1998; Ensminger and Knight 1997; Levi 1997;
 Lupia and McCubbins 1998). As these new choice-
 theoretic approaches become more defined and com-
 plete, we believe they can be easily integrated into the
 analytic narrative framework.
 UNCERTAINTY
 Having attempted to respond to Elster's questions, we
 now turn to another major criticism Elster makes in the
 text, our purported failure to deal adequately with
 uncertainty. He invites us to impale ourselves upon one
 of two horns, both chosen by him. On the one hand, he
 criticizes us for failing to employ models that take into
 account the effect of uncertainty; on the other, he
 brands such models as "artificial."
 Elster lumps together the separate issues of uncer-
 tainty and incomplete information. We use the concept
 of uncertainty in our chapters more than he recognizes.
 Consider, for example, Greif s analysis, which takes
 into account uncertainty about who will win the war,
 whether the emperor will come, whether the podesta'
 and one clan will ally, and so on.
 We are more cautious in applying models of incom-
 plete information, however. Because of their complex-
 ity, explicit reliance on Bayesian updating (which we
 doubt people use in reality), and artificiality, we felt
 that we should apply them only when failing to treat
 uncertainty would imply ignoring a central feature of
 the puzzle under investigation. In most instances, we
 found we could avoid the use of such models. We, like
 Buster, believe that political actors occupy a terrain
 clouded by uncertainty, but we also believe it is char-
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 acterized by sharp institutional features and powerful
 political forces. Events that take place in such settings
 do possess a high degree of contingency. When we give
 insufficient weight to the role of chance, we deprive
 ourselves of the opportunity to assess the level of
 confidence with which we can advocate our explana-
 tions. If we succeed in apprehending the major forces
 at play, then the systematic component of our expla-
 nations should prevail over that which is random.
 "JUST-SO" STORIES
 Elster suggests we are guilty of the very sin we try
 assiduously to avoid, namely, writing "just-so stories."
 We admit that it is difficult to elude this problem. In
 the analysis of a single case in biology-or social
 science-a just-so story can establish the plausibility of
 the theoretical perspective, but we resisted the temp-
 tation to stop at that point. Instead, we laid out the
 basis for our analytic decisions, indicated the deviations
 from the predictions of our initial models, and applied
 the criterion of falsifiability to our hypotheses.
 "We identify the actors, the decision points they
 faced, the choices they made, the paths taken and
 shunned, and the manner in which their choices gen-
 erated events and outcomes" (Bates et al. 1998, 13-4),
 and we do this in each of the single-authored chapters.
 We attempt to make clear the preferences and to
 model the outcome of choices. By this means, we aim
 to offer both a recognizable historical representation
 and an explanation of significant institutional arrange-
 ments and changes. The analytic narrative approach
 gains credibility when the equilibria of our models
 "imply the outcome we describe" (p. 12).
 Moreover, "when history contradicts the model, so
 much the worse for the model" (Goldstone 1998, 533).
 For example, when a model based only on self-interest
 fails to account for the change in citizen reactions to
 substitution and commutation, Levi employs an alter-
 native that permits her to explore the implications of
 the more narrow with the broader rational choice
 model. In the Bates chapter, the failure of the chain
 store paradox model highlighted the significance of
 high fixed costs in the production function of coffee.
 The Stigler/Pelzman model also foundered, but its
 internal inconsistency drove Bates to recognize the
 significance of security interests and the political role
 of large corporations.
 Contrary to what Elster argues, we do not employ
 formal theory to construct just-so stories. The theories
 are tested against the stories, and they can and do fail.
 From their failure, we then learn about the case. We
 use deductive theories for inductive purposes. As our
 introduction and conclusion describe, each of us goes
 back and forth between the model and the data, testing
 our ideas against reality.
 Elster (1989b, 3-10; 1999a, 1-47) himself makes "a
 plea for mechanisms," for the necessity to explanation
 of identifying the causal mechanisms. Elster argues
 that dozens of potential mechanisms potentially under-
 pin human behavior, which he takes to mean that there
 is no way to predict ex ante which mechanism will come
 700
 into play or, if many are at work, which will predomi-
 nate. If this correctly characterizes Elster's position,
 then only after the fact can one suggest which mecha-
 nisms work. As a consequence, his method is far more
 susceptible to "curve fitting" than is our own.
 We believe that rational choice offers a superior
 approach because it generates propositions that are
 refutable. Being subject to standard methods of evalu-
 ation-such as the out-of-sample testing of predictions
 and the systematic pursuit of falsification-the models
 we employ are not mere just-so stories.
 THE CASE STUDIES
 Elster finds much to which he objects in our book. By
 his own admission, however, much of his specific
 critique of the chapters focuses on secondary issues.
 What underlies this kind of criticism, however, is his
 belief that "to be analytic is above all to be obsessed
 with clarity and explicitness, to put oneself in the place
 of the reader and avoid ambiguity, vagueness, and
 hidden assumptions" (Elster 2000, 691). He argues that
 "not many, if any, of the chapters in AN live up to his
 demand," (p. 691). We beg to differ. We feel confident
 that most readers will find that each author produced
 an analytic narrative which both advances knowledge
 and produces generalizable and falsifiable implica-
 tions.6 And that formal reasoning was key to these
 contributions.
 Rather than go through each chapter and debate
 each of Elster's specific second-order charges, we
 addressed many of his more general and theoretical
 critiques in our answers to his six questions. There
 remain a few points to which we need to respond.
 Greif's Chapter
 Elster argues that the analysis does not support the
 assertion that external threat or internal innovation
 released resources for use in cooperative endeavors.
 He is absolutely correct; the analysis does not support
 his assertion. But it never attempted to do so. The
 focus is on a different issue, namely, the motivation to
 cooperate, not the ability to do so.
 Rosenthal's Chapter
 At no point does Elster contest Rosenthal's claim that
 the conclusions follow from his model or the fit be-
 tween the implications of the model and the historical
 records. Changing the division of spoils, the "war bias"
 of the crown, or the incentives of the elite to free ride
 would indeed change the predictions that issue from
 Rosenthal's model and lead to convergence between
 the policies of England and France, just as Elster
 claims. But then the modified model would be contra-
 dicted by fact and thus proven wrong!
 6 We all draw on related research available in published and forth-
 coming material. See, for example, Bates 1997, Levi 1997, Greif n.d.,
 Hoffman and Rosenthal 1997, and Weingast n.d.
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 Levi's Chapter
 Elster's condemnation of Levi's logic rests more on
 misunderstanding and honest disagreement than on
 pinpointing logical flaws in her argumentation. Elster
 maintains that "abolition of replacement and introduc-
 tion of universal suffrage were part of the same ground
 swell-not that the latter was the cause of the former"
 (Elster 2000, 688); this is Levi's explanation, too. He
 critiques her for holding a different view than his about
 the relationship between fairness and rationality and a
 distinct interpretation of the actors' preferences. Elster
 correctly chastises her for inconsistent wording; price is
 indeed an object, even in the considerations of the
 wealthy. But he does not seem to disagree on what is
 easier or less costly.
 Weingast's Chapter
 Elster questions Weingast's principal argument that
 Americans constructed antebellum political stability in
 part on the balance rule. His main criticism is that
 pairing occurred because southerners blackmailed
 northerners by holding the admission of northern
 states hostage to the admission of southern ones. This
 assertion supports rather than contradicts Weingast's
 thesis. The South held up admission of free states
 precisely to maintain a balance, and it used its sectional
 veto to do this. Elster's comments therefore add to
 Weingast's argument by showing how the balance rule
 was self-enforcing during this period.
 Bates's Chapter
 Elster criticizes Bates for not showing how the con-
 sumer side of the market enforced the agreement.
 Elster appears to be looking for a unilateral form of
 intervention; indeed, he cites one attempt (by the U.S.
 government) and conjectures regarding the possibility
 of another (by U.S. corporations, acting in Central
 America). But the very form of the explanations ad-
 vanced by Bates rest on game-theoretic reasoning;
 rather than seek forms of unilateral imposition, he
 seeks behaviors that would prevail in equilibrium.
 In short, our responses underscore a larger problem
 with the review: Elster's repeated failure to engage
 with the main points made by the essays or his mis-
 reading of them.
 CHARACTERISTICS OF ARGUMENTS
 Elster's criticism of our work is, and was intended to
 be, powerful. It is a "scorched earth" review, and we
 have tried to resist the temptation to respond in kind.
 However, we have, on occasion, felt compelled to
 answer some of his criticisms with a tone that matches
 his, especially since much of the power of Elster's
 critique is due to the substitution of his premises for
 our own and then showing that our results do not
 follow. He advances his premises so diffidently that it
 may not appear reasonable to object, but there is little
 diffidence in the manner in which he claims to clinch
 the subsequent argument, even though the argument
 that fails is his, not our own.
 Elster often substitutes his opinions for our judg-
 ments. Admitting that he is not an expert on French
 politics of the period, he nonetheless feels free to
 reconstruct the preferences of social groupings, as
 depicted by Levi. If he cannot see that it would be
 reasonable to suppose that the groups prefer one form
 of recruitment to another, then perhaps it is because,
 unlike Levi, he has not immersed himself in the
 necessary evidence. Although he admits he is "not a
 specialist" (Elster 2000, 690) on nineteenth-century
 American politics, Elster nonetheless feels free to
 "doubt the existence" (p. 689) of a convention regard-
 ing the admission of states to the Union. He is entitled
 to challenge our logic, and we cannot simply resort to
 our detailed knowledge of the cases as our defense. But
 given that we attempted to combine reasonable claims
 with in-depth research, it is incumbent upon Elster to
 demonstrate how his alternative and abstractly derived
 construction matters empirically. At issue is more than
 a question of taste. At issue is a better or worse
 explanation of actual events.
 Elster repeatedly seeks to ensnare his prey in double
 binds. On the one hand, for example, he calls for the
 clarity that only, he claims, a formal model can provide;
 on the other hand, he then attacks a model-"to the
 extent I understand it" (Elster 2000, 689)-for failing
 to add "to the verbal presentation" (p. 689). On the
 one hand, he criticizes a chapter for deviating from
 "standard rational choice theory" (p. 695); on the other
 hand, he condemns the authors for depicting actors as
 being fully rational. He endorses collective action
 theory but less than a page later brands collective
 action theory for being "rococo (or is it baroque?)" (p.
 695). The authors are thus damned if they do and
 damned if they do not.
 Elster cites distinguished figures, long dead, to add
 authority to his arguments, but he often does an
 injustice to their actual words and meaning. For exam-
 ple, Elster enlists Pascal, applying to our enterprise the
 phrases applied by Pascal to the mechanistic biology of
 Descartes: "ridiculous-pointless, uncertain, and ardu-
 ous." When he wrote these words, Pascal had aban-
 doned philosophy for faith. For our part, we are
 engaged in secular pursuits, and we take inspiration
 from history's vindication of Descartes; "mechanistic
 biology" has proven fertile, yielding major advances in
 medicine and medical engineering.
 Rhetoric helps Elster forcefully communicate his low
 opinion of our work. The tone is Olympian and harsh,
 and it diverts attention from his failure to engage with
 the substance of our cases and our method.
 CONCLUSION
 Elster criticizes us at three levels. First, he claims that
 we fail to execute the program we propose; that is, we
 fail to apply skillfully or persuasively formal theories to
 elucidate complex cases. We believe him wrong and
 encourage readers to explore the case studies and
 decide for themselves.
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 Second, Elster argues that our framework is itself
 flawed or, at best, premature; he chides us for "exces-
 sive ambition" in attempting "deductive rational choice
 modeling of large-scale historical phenomena." His
 real opponent is rational choice theory. But as a critic
 of the analytic narrative approach, Elster fails to
 engage with the main purposes of our book: How can
 we build and test systematic explanations based on case
 studies? How can we move from the world of a
 problem to be studied to a test to be administered?
 Moreover, the analytic narrative method easily affords
 substituting more general modes of "choice" for the
 explicitly-and limited-rational choice game theory.
 Put simply, we believe that the debate over choice
 versus rational choice is orthogonal to the issues we
 raise.
 The burden is on Elster to explicate a better meth-
 odological alternative that can actually inform empiri-
 cal research. This means demonstrating how the weak-
 nesses of rational choice adversely affect the use we
 make of it. Unless Elster can show how the assump-
 tions of rationality lead us to conclusions that are
 wrong, he is merely restating obvious truths rather than
 uncovering material errors. Unless he can offer us a
 better set of tools, we shall proceed with those we have.
 Finally, Elster criticizes Analytic Narratives because
 we espouse an ambition to a genuine social science. We
 believe that generalizations are possible and that many
 have emerged in the social sciences. Our project rep-
 resents an attempt to bring some analytical tools to the
 task of studying unique case studies, a question long of
 interest to political scientists.
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